

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

MEMO TO: Timothy Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: Matthew Duncan and Rory Rauch, Pantex Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending April 20, 2012

DNFSB Staff Activity: B. Laake was at Pantex to augment Site Rep coverage.

Hoist Malfunction: Last week, a safety class hoist malfunctioned while technicians were using it to transfer a nuclear explosive (NE) to a workstand (See 4/13/12 report). System engineers completed an evaluation of the hoist malfunction this week. They initially believed this issue may be similar to the problems previously experienced with the new hoists (see 9/2/11 report). However, they could not find any signs of excessive chain wear as have been seen in other facilities. During the evaluation, the hoist functioned as intended while lowering and raising the hook and passed a 100 percent load test. The malfunction could not be repeated. System engineers determined that the popping noise heard by the technicians was the chain piling up in the bucket. Because no conditions were identified that would affect the operability of the hoist, the facility manager returned it to service.

CROWS Nuclear Explosive Safety Change Evaluation (NCE): NNSA completed an NCE of the use of the Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station (CROWS). The NES study group determined that the use of the CROWS satisfied the DOE nuclear explosive safety standards. There were no pre-start findings, no post-start findings, and no deliberation topics.

Blast Door Interlock (BDI) Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) Deficiency Closure: On April 22, 2010, a PXSO Safety System Functional Assessment of the BDI system identified a deficiency in the LCO for the BDI system. The deficiency stated that the LCO bases document did not include the components of the BDI that had to function properly to prevent both sets of doors from opening simultaneously; however, these components were generally identified in the operability statements in the LCO. This week, PXSO agreed to defer revising the LCO to eliminate the deficiency until the comprehensive Documented Safety Analysis Upgrade Initiative (DSAUGI) addresses issue. B&W plans to complete the DSAUGI in approximately three to five years.

Interim Guidance for Anomalous Units: On March 30, 2012, NNSA provided interim guidance to production and design agencies for handling of anomalous units until permanent direction is incorporated in the directives. This guidance addresses five of the judgments of need identified by the W78 Anomalous Unit Case Study (see 10/21/2011 report). The guidance defines when a unit should be considered anomalous and defines the B&W Process Engineer, in conjunction with the Design Agency System Engineer and the nuclear explosive safety representative, as the anomalous unit authority. Additionally, the guidance defines the membership and roles and responsibilities of an Anomalous Unit Ad Hoc Project team that will lead the recovery activities and define the extent of condition associated with an anomalous unit. This week PXSO directed B&W to define and establish procedures to implement this guidance.